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RECENT CASES
that a corporation is justified, in the interests of its stockholders, in
seeking to control stock ownership through the option to buy,22 and
that restrictions may operate effectively upon transfers by death.23 In
the case of small, closely-held corporations, such restrictions serve a
widely approved and sometimes urgent purpose.
If the policy favoring reasonable restrictions may be accepted as
valid, the present decision should be closely evaluated and perhaps
regarded as distinguishable on future occasions. If the restriction
policy is approved, only to have its application defeated whenever an
individual shareholder dies, then the interests of corporate ownership
groups are needlessly impaired.
Jesse S. Hogg
CnamTAL PNocErE-N~mowNG rm DocrimE OF T=E TRtsPAssiNG
OFFcER-State Police officers, dressed in street clothes and driving an
unmarked car, drove off a public highway onto the private property
of the defendant. Acting on information of bootlegging and on per-
sonal observation of an unusual flow of traffic to and from an aban-
doned service station on the defendant's property, the officers turned
into the encircling drive, approached the back door and ordered beer.
When the defendant returned from the building with the order, the
officers placed him under arrest, seized the beer and proceeded to
search the nearby building. The defendant was convicted of the
illegal sale of intoxicating liquors, fined and imprisoned.1 He appealed
unsuccessfully to the Rowan Circuit Court, and then to the Court of
Appeals, assigning as error the admission into evidence of the beer
taken form his person. Held: affirmed. 'The officers were not tres-
passers but were business invitees. They could properly arrest for a
misdemeanor committed in their presence and make an incidental
search of the defendant's body and seize the beer found thereon.
Staton v. Commonwealth, 307 S.W. 2d 570 (Ky. 1957).
The court reasoned that the officers making the arrest were cus-
tomers, not trespassers, regardless of their intent. The court cited no
authority, but distinguished Alfred v. Commonwealth,2 the principal
case relied on by the defendant. In that case the court held that when
v. Chamberlain, 191 F. 2d 532 (1951), Misc. 68 N.Y.S. 2d 335 (1946); Searles v.
Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 128 Me. 34, 145 AUt. 391 (1929).
22 12 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations see. 5454, at 306 (Perm ed. 1957 rev.
vol.).
Vo.3 Ibid.
1 See Ky. Rev. Stat. see. 242.230(1) (1956).
2 272 S.W. 2d 44 (Ky. 1954).
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officers trespassed onto a defendant's private premises, and looked
through a car window, this constituted an illegal search and the sub-
sequent arrest and seizure were improper. The court distinguished
the instant case on the grounds that (a) here the arrest did not arise
from a search and seizure at all, but rather from a voluntary sale to a
customer constituting a misdemeanor committed in an officer's pres-
ence, and (b) the officers here were not trespassers at all.3
The case is of two-fold importance. It narrowed a line of previous
cases in which the court had held that when an officer was illegally
upon the premises of the defendant, any subsequent arrest or search
and seizure growing out of such a trespass was illegal. The case is
also a most interesting commentary upon the delicacy of the research
system upon which all lawyers must rely, in that the report of the
case, in both the syllabus and the keyed headnote, makes a statement,
purportedly the holding of the court, which was never properly
before the court for its consideration.4
Under the provisions of section 36 of the Kentucky Criminal Code,
a peace officer may make an arrest "[W]ithout a warrant, when a
public offense is committed in his presence. . . ." In interpreting this
provision the Court of Appeals has consistently held5 that an officer
who has made a valid arrest may make an incidental search and
seizure of the person arrested, without violating the state Constitu-
tional prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. 6 It was
therefore necesary in the present case for the Commonwealth to show
that the arrest was valid if the evidence afterwards seized was to be
admissible. Towards that end, the Commonwealth argued that no
3Staton v. Commonwealth, 307 S.W. 2d 570 (Ky. 1957).4 In the present case the following statement was made in both the syllabus
and the keyed headnote, which was carried in turn into the digest systems as the
holding of the Court of Appeals:
• ..and defendant's subsequent arrest without a warrant was law-
ful, and beer and whiskey found in the search of premises without
a search warrant was admissible."
From the transcript of the trial and from the appellate briefs, it is clear that no
evidence obtained by the search of the premises was ever introduced, or offered
in evidence. The problem of how far an incidental search and seizure may be
extended following an arrest is complicated enough on its merits, without being
confused by statements not made by a court in its decision, and on issues never
before the court for its consideration. It is not unlikely that future cases of in-
cidental search, either in this Commonwealth, or beyond its borders, will cite this
case as authority for a conclusion it never reached.
5 Commonwealth v. Warner, 198 Ky. 784, 250 S.W. 86 (1923); Royce v.
Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 480, 239 S.W. 795 (1922).6 Kentucky Constitution, Article 10, provides:
"The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and pos-
sessions, from unreasonable search and seizure; and no warrant shall
issue to search any place, or seize any person or thing, without de-
scribing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation."
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warrant of any kind was required to allow officers to go onto the
premises and purchase liquor, "whether those premises be public or
private." 7 Once such a sale was made, it constituted an offense com-
mitted in the presence of the officer, and the subsequent arrest and
seizure were valid. The contention of the defendant was simple: the
officers were trespassers without a warrant, and anything they did
while in that capacity was illegal.
The Court of Appeals has decided a series of cases holding that
an arrest, or a search and seizure, made by an officer illegally on the
property of the defendant was invalid, and evidence procured thereby
was inadmissible. The first of these was Simmons v. Commonwealth.8
In that case an officer, investigating the source of an uncommon noise,
knocked on the door of the defendant's room opening off a hallway in
an apartment building. The knock caused the door to open, disclosing,
in addition to the sleeping form of the defendant, a supply of moon-
shine. The court held that, assuming that the officer had a legal right
to be in the hallway, the "forced opening" of the door constituted an
illegal entry into private premises without a warrant and his dis-
coveries were inadmissible. In a similar case, the court rejected evidence
of the operation of a still on the grounds that the mere commission
of a crime in the officer's presence did not render admissible evidence
of a crime discovered while he was illegally trespassing on the private
property of the defendant.9
In Keohler v. Commonwealth,10 county patrolmen had gone onto
the premises of the defendant to serve civil orders of execution and
delivery, and had discovered whiskey in the illegal possession of the
defendant. The court held that since the officers had no legal power
to execute these orders, they were trespassers, and that discoveries
made while in that capacity were not admissible merely because the
discovery of the evidence constituted per se the commission of a mis-
demeanor in the officers' presence." In Miller v. Commonwealth,12 a
federal officer had gone onto private property, allegedly to request a
drink of water. While the water was being hoisted from a well the
7 Brief for the Appellee, page 3, Staton v. Conwnonwealth, 307 S.W. 2d 570
(Ky. 1957).
8203 Ky. 621, 262 S.W. 972 (1924).
9 Fleming v. Commonwealth, 217 Ky. 169, 289 S.W. 212 (1926).10 222 Ky. 670, 1 S.W. 2d 1072 (1928)
11 Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 242.230(2) provides that:
"No persons shall possess any alcoholic beverage unless it has been
lawfully acquired and is intended to be used lawfully, and in any
action the defendant shall have the burden of proving that the
alcoholic beverages found in his ,possession were lawfully acquired
and were intended for lawful use.
12235 Ky. 825, 32 S.W. 2d 416 (1930).
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officer spied, through a crack in a nearby building, tubs containing
illicit mash. The Commonwealth argued, as in the present case, that
the officer was legally on the premises by the implied consent of the
owner, and that the sight of the illegal mash constituted an offense in
his presence for which he could make a valid arrest and an incidental
search.13 The court considered this argument "far-fetched."
In each of these latter two cases the court appeared to reason
that a technical trespass by an officer, however mistaken or in belief
of right he might have been, rendered a discovery of evidence con-
stituting the commission of a crime in the officers' presence inadmis-
sible. If the Constitution thus clearly invalidates the actions of of-
ficers whose technical trespass was not made with the intent to avoid
the necessity for obtaining a warrant, should it not a fortiori condemn
the arrests made by officers wilfully and deliberately trespassing for
the very purpose of making an arrest without a warrant? To avoid
this objection, the court concluded that the officers in the instant case
were not trespassers at all, but rather were business invitees, the
recipients of an implied invitation "extended to officers as well as to
members of the thirsty public generally."14 But by characterizing the
officers as "business invitees" the court has opened the door to entries
upon private property whenever, in the opinion of the officers, the
comings and goings of others indicate that the premises are "open
to business."15 The validity of the entry and the subsequent arrest
will thus turn on mere suspicions of the officers. It seems settled that
an officer cannot lawfully enter upon private property upon the mere
suspicion or belief that a misdemeanor is being committed therein,
for the purpose of viewing the inmates, and then arrest on the theory
that the act is in his presence.16 The court might have considered
that enough evidence was presented to the senses of the officers from
their position on the road as to constitute an offense committed in their
presence. This construction of the facts would test the validity of
the entry and arrest not upon the dangerously vague suspicions of the
13 The holding of the court in the Miller case is obscure. The decision was
clear that the seizure of the evidence was illegal; but the court did not dis-
tinguish whether any of three 4actors, or all of them determined that result. The
same result could have been reached by holding that either (a) the officers were
trespassers at the time of their discovery, (b) no crime had been committed in
the officer's presence prior to the time of the physical search of the premises, or
(c) no arrest of the defendant had been made prior to search. The Court found
against all three factors alternatively, and held the evidence inadmissible.
14 Staton v. Commonwealth, 807 S.W. 2d 570, 571 (Ky. 1957).
15 The use in criminal cases of tort classifications of trespassers and business
invitees, raises the obvious question of future extension. In the next case will the
court stop at the distinction settled on here, or will it extend its mantle over the
licensee, who, like the business invitee, is the recepient of an implied invitation?
16Annot., 26 A.L.R. 286 (1923).
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officers as to a "business invitation," but on the narrower criterion
of what constitutes the commission of an offense "in the presence" of
an officer. In Giannini v. Garland, the court held:
[If the officer by his presence becomes informed through any of his
senses of material elements of the particular crime, which has a
tendency to produce in the minds of a reasonably prudent person that
it is morally certain that the principal fact occurred, the offense may
be considered as having been committed in his presence, although he
did not discover all of the elements necessary to the completion of the
offense .... 17
This construction might have proved a safer and more workable guide
to future decision.
Conclusion
From an examination of the cited authorities, one must conclude
that the court has narrowly distinguished this case from a line of
previous cases with which it could have been soundly coupled. The
characterization of the officers as customers rather than trespassers
seems strained, particularly in the light of the provisions of the
Criminal Code which do not provide for an arrest without a warrant
for misdemeanors on reasonable belief. Certainly while a different
holding might have engendered cries of unnecessary protection of the
criminal element, it should be noted that there was no showing that
a warrant could not have been obtained, or any suggestion that the
delay would have allowed the quarry to escape. As to the argument
that such protection unduly frustrates effective law enforcement, the
Supreme Court has answered through Mr. Justice Jackson that:
We meet in this case, as in many, the appeal to necessity. It is said
that if such arrests and searches cannot be made, law enforcement
will be more difficult and uncertain. But the forefathers, after con-
sulting the lessons of history, designed our Constitution to place ob-
stacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance, which
they seemed to think was a greater danger to a free people than the
escape of some criminals from punishment.' 8
Donald D. Harkins
DomEsTc RELATIONS-ENFoRCEAB rY OF ANTENupTiAL CoNTRAcrs
CONCERNING THE RELIGIOUS TRAINING OF Cm:DREN-A Protestant
woman and a Catholic man, in contemplation of marriage, entered
into a contract whereby they agreed that their children should be
17296 Ky. 361, 366, 177 S.W. 2d 133, 135 (1944). Cf. Weaver v. McGovem,
122 Ky. 1, 90 S.W. 984 (1906); Dilger v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 550, 11 S.W.
651 (1889).18 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
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